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Nonprofit organizations present the analyst with a slew of puzzles.  To an economist 
conditioned to think in terms of objectives and constraints, even the mathematical definition 
of the beast is a problem.  What is a nonprofit organization?  How does this definition shape 
the elaboration of objectives and constraints?   
 
What are those objectives, or as Dennis Young put it in the title of his 1983 book, ‘If Not for 
Profit, For What?’  Organizational founders choose whether to pursue their personal 
objectives through creation of for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations, government agencies, 
and other structures. Why do some entrepreneurs choose the nonprofit form, knowingly 
sacrificing their right to ever receive financial returns from the organizations they start?  Why 
do entrepreneurs in some industries choose one form (nonprofit or for-profit) or the other 
exclusively, whereas in other industries, a mixture of organizational forms stably coexist? 
 
For-profit firms obtain most of their revenues from the sale of goods and services.  Some 
nonprofits, which Hansmann (1980) labels ‘commercial’ do the same.  How, if at all, do 
commercial nonprofits differ from for-profit competitors?  Other (‘donative’) nonprofits obtain 
most of their revenues from donations, which for-profit firms never do.  Are these donations 
part of an exchange process between nonprofits and donors, and if so, what services are 
the nonprofits selling?  Does the nondistribution constraint determine why donations are 
made to nonprofits but not for-profits, or is this difference due to laws and regulations that 
favor gifts to organizations taking one form and not the other?  Finally, some nonprofits 
obtain their revenues from both sources – sales and donations.  Are there interactions 
between the two that affect the pricing and fundraising decisions of nonprofits? 
                                                          
* This is the draft of an introductory essay for a book reprinting classic articles on the economics of nonprofit 
organizations, tentatively entitled The Economics of Nonprofit Enterprises, to be published by Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd.  The essay is written by the book’s editor, Richard Steinberg, who can be reached as 
rsteinbe@iupui.edu or via the Department of Economics, 516 Cavanaugh Hall, IUPUI, Indianapolis, IN 46202-
5140.  




This book brings together some of the most important articles on the topic of the economics 
of nonprofit organizations.  The topic attracted a few early works (Tullock, 1966; Newhouse, 
1970;  Feldstein 1971;  Pauly and Redisch, 1973), but the subject lacked coherence until 
Hansmann (1980) articulated an economically-useful definition: A public or private nonprofit 
organization is one restricted, by law or internal governance mechanisms, from distributing 
residual earnings to individuals who exercise control over the organization, such as officers, 
directors, or members.  As we will see, this ‘nondistribution constraint’ affects the 
organization’s entry and exit decision, market for control, costs of obtaining resources, form 
of managerial compensation, and characteristics of those who chose to work for the 
organization.  By this definition, government agencies are arguably nonprofit (depending 
whether control inheres in government officials or the electorate), but I shall reserve use of 
the term ‘nonprofit’ for private agencies in what follows.  Hansmann’s definition provided 
something that economic modelers could build upon, and the pace of progress has 
accelerated since then. 
 
In a real sense, I regard this book as volume II on the subject.  Rose-Ackerman edited a 
book in 1986, entitled The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and 
Policy, which contains many important earlier works.  Although not compiled for the Edward 
Elgar series of reference collections, it has stood the test of time and serves this purpose.  
Rather than reprint most of the papers appearing in the 1986 volume, I will refer to them in 
this introductory survey.  For those unable to obtain the Rose-Ackerman volume, I include 
two surveys of the earlier literature prepared around that time (Hansmann, 1987 and 
Steinberg, 1987, reproduced here as Chapters 1 and 2).  In addition, you might want to read 
James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) which builds on the edited volume but references many 
other early sources and Rose-Ackerman (1996) for a perspective that complements the 
present volume. 
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The literature on nonprofit organizations developed in three waves.  The first wave of articles 
asserted some plausible objective for a nonprofit organization possessing monopoly power, 
then derived the implications of that objective for organizational behavior.  The second wave 
looked more broadly at the role of nonprofit organizations in a wider economy as they 
compete or collaborate with for-profit firms and government agencies.  The third wave 
begins development of integrated theories in which the objectives of nonprofit organizations 
emerge endogenously within an environment potentially containing organizations from other 
sectors (for-profit and government).  This description of the intellectual development of the 
field is constructed after the fact.  Some ‘first-wave’ papers continue to be written, and 
elements of the third wave can be found in some early papers.  However, the ‘wave’ 
metaphor does provide a useful framework for thinking about the development of the field 
and is employed here despite its shortcomings.  Following description of each wave, I 
summarize two strands of literature that do not fit naturally into this framework: intersectoral 
comparisons of performance and analyses of public policies toward nonprofit organizations.  
Each of these strands began atheoretically, but have gradually grown to incorporate insights 
from the second and third waves.  For example, Grabowski and Hirth (2003) build on Hirth’s 
(1999, reproduced here as Chapter 14) second-wave insight that there are competitive 
spillovers from nonprofit to for-profit nursing homes.  They then estimated for-profit 
performance through regression analyses that acount for the nonprofit market share. 
 
The First Wave: Asserting the Objective Functions 
 
Papers in the first wave asserted that nonprofit behavior results from a variety of plausible 
objective functions.  Most of these papers start by confronting economists’ predisposition to 
regard profit maximization as the universal goal of organizations in market economies.   We 
now understand their arguments as immediate corollaries to Hansmann’s (1980) 
nondistribution constraint.  Those in control of the nonprofit are prohibited from receiving the 
financial surplus generated by their decisions, so departures from profit maximization have a 
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low opportunity cost to nonprofit ‘owners.’  This same nondistribution constraint, if fully 
enforced, makes it impossible for nonprofit owners to profit from transferring their ownership 
rights to others, removing the market for control that disciplines departures from profit-
maximizing behavior by publicly-traded for-profit firms.  How then is this freedom to pursue 
other objectives used? 
 
Two early papers developed the idea that a nonprofit organization might want to maximize 
its budget, rather than the charitable services it provides.  Tullock (1966) argued that the 
managers of donative nonprofits prefer to maximize the size of the budget under their 
control, rather than the amount they expend on charitable services.  This is because larger 
budgets bring more prestige and higher financial compensation to nonprofit managers.  To 
maximize the budget, the organization would seek to maximize gross donations, rather than 
net-of-solicitation-expenditure donations received.  In contrast, a service-maximizing 
nonprofit organization would seek to maximize net donations, as this is the sum left over for 
providing charitable services after campaign expenses are accounted for.   Niskanen (1971) 
argued that commercial nonprofits also seek to maximize their budgets.  
 
Steinberg (1986, reproduced here as Chapter 18) recognized that one can distinguish these 
alternative objectives, for donative nonprofits, by looking at the ‘marginal donative product of 
fundraising’ (the increment to donations produced by an incremental dollar spent on 
solicitation).  Estimates of marginal donative product then reveal the objective underlying the 
fundraising decision.   He found that U.S. ‘health’ nonprofits reveal themselves to be budget 
maximizers, whereas ‘arts’, ‘education’, and ‘welfare’ nonprofits act as service maximizers.  
Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995, reproduced here as Chapter 19) conducted a similar 
exercise using a panel of U.K. nonprofits.  They found that ‘health’ and ‘overseas’ charities 
act like service maximizers, whereas ‘religion’ organizations act like budget maximizers. 
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Newhouse (1970) argued that nonprofit hospitals maximized a combination of quality and 
quantity, and this work inspired similar approaches for other kinds of nonprofits (James and 
Neuberger, 1981 or Hansmann, 1981, reproduced here as Chapter 10).  This objective is 
plausible because managerial prestige depends upon both.  Further, many nonprofits state 
that their goal is to foster tastes for merit goods (goods like opera appreciation that, in the 
organization’s opinion, consumers do not want as much as they should).  Others argued that 
nonprofits maximize the net income per member of a controlling group of agents (Pauly and 
Redisch, 1973) or the non-pecuniary income of owners (Migué and Bélanger, 1974;  Borjas, 
Frech and Ginsburg, 1983).  Malani, Philipson, and David (forthcoming) provided a model 
that nicely nests many of these alternative objective functions, highlighting their points of 
agreement and disagreement on comparative-static behavior.   
 
Weisbrod  took the mission statements of many nonprofit organizations more seriously, 
suggesting the label ‘bonoficing’ for the objective function of organizations "whose goals 
include distributing outputs to ‘needy’ or to ‘deserving’ persons regardless of ability to pay, 
as well as treating underinformed consumers ‘fairly,’ even at the expense of profits." (1988, 
p. 143).  Bonoficing might include goals such as preserving plants and animals in a botanic 
garden or zoo or advancing the state of scientific research  knowledge about a disease.  
James examined the comparative statics of nonprofit organizations that care positively about 
some outputs, negatively about other outputs (which are produced only if they are 
sufficiently profitable, enabling the cross-subsidization of favored outputs) and not at all 
about still other outputs (which are produced whenever they generate positive profits).  
Finally, Holtman (1983) asserted that nonprofit organizations maximize social welfare.  
 
The Second Wave: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations  
 
First-wave papers looked at the behavior of individual nonprofit organizations, assumed to 
occupy specified market niches without competition and, often, without explanation.  The 
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next step was to consider other actors who might compete or collaborate with nonprofits and 
try to identify the niches that will be filled by nonprofits.  These other actors include other 
nonprofits, government agencies, for-profit firms, and sometimes others (such as the family, 
informal associations, cooperatives, and worker-managed firms).  Why are some industries 
exclusively nonprofit, others exclusively for-profit, and others mixed?  Are nonprofits 
particularly good at certain types of activities?  Does the presence of nonprofit organizations 
in a market improve the performance of government agencies and for-profit firms?   
 
Two nonprofit roles have dominated the literature to date.  Weisbrod (1975) emphasized the 
nonprofit role in the provision of public goods, and Hansmann (1980) emphasized the 
nonprofit role in correcting market failures due to asymmetric information.  Each of these 
roles is discussed here, followed by a summary of the much scanter literature on other roles 
played by nonprofit organizations.   
 
The Role of Nonprofits in Providing Public Goods 
 
Weisbrod (1975, 1988) noted that most nonprofits provide public (nonrival and 
nonexcludable) goods as part of their output mix.  For example, although the food, clothing, 
and shelter that charities provide to needy individuals are consumed by the recipient, 
altruists are each made better off when anyone helps the needy.  In addition, poverty 
creates external costs that are eased in a nonrival and nonexcludable way by the efforts of 
charity.  Education enhances the earning power of students (a private gain), but a more 
educated citizenry enhances the quality of democratic processes (public).  Advocacy 
simultaneously produces public goods for supporters of the cause and public bads for 
opponents.  Religious institutions arguably foster development of social capital (resources 
that inhere in community social organization such as trust and authority), another public 
good. 
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Economists are familiar with the reasons why for-profit firms do not provide pure public 
goods, and usually think of government as the institution of choice for public-good provision.  
Weisbrod (1975) reminded us that a consensus on the level of governmental provision of 
public goods rarely exists, as Lindahl taxes are impractical and Tiebout migration is limited.  
Weisbrod focused on Bowen’s theory that the median-preference voter is decisive, but 
whatever level of public-good expenditure is selected by political processes, some would like 
to see more spent.  These ‘high demanders’ donate to nonprofit organizations that 
supplement governmental provision of public goods.  He does not explicitly model why high-
demanders make donations to nonprofit organizations rather than free-riding or donating to 
for-profits, but suggests many reasons developed formally in later works such as Bilodeau 
and Slivinski (1998, reproduced here as Chapter 7).  Note that Weisbrod does not try to 
explain the nonprofit share of public-good provision because his theory says nothing about 
government-financed contractual provision by nonprofits.  His 1975 theory explains that 
share of public-good provision financed by donations.  
 
James (1993, reproduced here as Chapter 11) put Weisbrod’s theory (and several others, 
discussed later) to the test, exploring the reasons why different countries chose a different 
mixture of public and private education at the primary- and secondary-school levels.  She 
assumed that both the type of public education and expenditure on that education are 
determined by political processes.  When preferences for either the type or level of 
education are more diverse, dissatisfaction with public schools will be higher and 
consequently, we should see a larger share of education provided through privately-financed 
private education.  This is precisely what she found.   Controlling for government subsidies 
to private education, the private share grew with measures of the heterogeneity of tastes, 
particularly with measures of religious heterogeneity.  
When provision of a private good produces beneficial externalities (nonrival and 
nonexcludable), for-profit firms will sell that good, although they will not provide the optimal 
quantity.  Preston (1988, reproduced here as Chapter 9) showed how the presence of 
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nonprofit organizations in a market can improve this situation.  More specifically, she 
considered a model of product differentiation in which outputs differ in their ratio of private to 
public benefits.  The equilibrium product spectrum when nonprofits are excluded from the 
market supplies a limited range of alternatives.  When nonprofits and for-profits coexist, the 
equilibrium product spectrum is broader and pareto-dominates the for-profit only equilibrium.  
Her results are particularly strong in that she does not rely on an organizational objective 
function that incorporates public benefits.  Her managers maximize their financial 
compensation by maximizing the organization’s budget, which they accomplish by providing 
an output mixture that considers both donor and purchaser preferences.  Her results are 
weaker because they depend upon donor knowledge of the ratios of public to private 
benefits at each organization.  Although expecting that most donors are so well informed is 
unrealistic, her results provide useful insight for a world in which a few key donors are well 
informed and managers value both financial compensation and the provision of socially-
beneficial outputs by the organizations they control.  
 
Rose-Ackerman (1987, reproduced here as Chapter 6) also looked at nonprofits that 
produce public goods differing in some characteristic.  That characteristic could be aesthetic 
(as in abstract vs. representational art), ideologic (as in the religious character of a private 
school), or technical (as in the teaching philosophy of a private school).  In contrast to 
Preston, Rose-Ackerman’s managers care about that characteristic, and the manager’s 
preferred value for that characteristic may not match the value preferred by the 
organization’s donors.  A compromise is struck on the characteristics of the public good, and 
the terms of that compromise depend upon the other financial resources available to the 
manager.  Lump-sum government grants allow the nonprofit manager to move closer to his 
or her ideal level of the characteristic, and grants with strings attached can move the 
manager closer to the donor’s preferred level. 
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Eckel and Steinberg (1993) assumed that nonprofit managers value two job attributes – 
private-benefit perks and the public-benefit perk of using their job to provide public goods.  
The nonprofit organization sells a private good and uses the net proceeds to cross-subsidize 
these two job attributes.  Equilibrium public-good provision then depends on the manager’s 
marginal rate of substitution between these job attributes and on the competitive 
environment.  If managers value public-benefit perks sufficiently, then nonprofit monopolies 
provide an attractive way to finance public-good provision.  This institution is attractive 
because the welfare gains from incremental public-good provision can outweigh the 
deadweight loss from monopoly.  Further, if the incremental excess-burden of feasible taxes 
is sufficiently large, nonprofit monopolies would dominate governmental tax-financed 
provision of public goods. 
 
Nonprofits also provide excludable public goods, especially in the realm of ‘high culture’ 
(operas, symphony orchestras, art museums, and the like).  For-profit firms are generally 
willing to provide excludable public goods, but may under provide them and will over exclude 
(that is, keep some consumers that place positive value on the public good from consuming 
the good in order to protect its pricing structure).  High-culture goods typically enjoy high 
fixed and low marginal costs and face limited consumer demand.  In this situation, single-
price for-profit monopolies would not produce the good at all, and price-discriminating for-
profit monopolies would be unable to solve the demand-revelation problem.  Hansmann 
(1981, reproduced here as Chapter 10) showed that donations to nonprofits serve as a form 
of ‘voluntary price discrimination’ enabling production of the good in question.  In a similar 
model, Ben-Ner (1986) showed that the nondistribution constraint allows nonprofits to solve 
the demand revelation problem and that the control of nonprofits by customers and donors 
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The Role of Nonprofits in Situations of Asymmetric Information 
 
A major strand of the literature argues that nonprofits are more trustworthy than for-profits in 
certain situations of asymmetric information.  Arrow (1963) was the first to recognize this 
argument as it applies to health care organizations, where the quality of services provided is 
hard for consumers to verify, even ex poste.  In such situations, he argued, the profit 
orientation of for-profits interferes with the trust relationships needed to support provision of 
high-quality care.  Nelson and Krashinsky (1973) made a similar argument with respect to 
day-care providers, and Hansmann (1980) extended the argument to all kinds of nonprofits.  
He labeled situations where ‘owing either to the circumstances under which a service is 
purchased or consumed or to the nature of the service itself, consumers feel unable to 
evaluate accurately the quantity or quality of the service the firm produces for them’ 
(Hansmann, 1987, p. 29 reproduced here as Chapter 2) as ones involving ‘contract failure’.  
In situations of contract failure, the consumer is unable to write an enforceable contract, and 
recognizes that for-profit firms will short-change her on either quantity or quality in order to 
distribute larger dividend checks and avoid takeover bids.  Consumers turn to nonprofit 
organizations because the nondistribution constraint provides some assurance that these 
motives will not come into play. 
 
Contract failure certainly applies to collective efforts to finance public goods.  For example, if 
one individual asks an organization to provide food for starving residents of a far-off nation, 
he will find it difficult to find out whether two aspects of the contract have been complied 
with.  First, finding out whether these people have been fed at all would be difficult, as hiring 
a trustworthy observer in a foreign land would be costly.  More fundamentally, as long as the 
organization spends at least as much on total food aid as that individual paid for, the 
individual will be unable to tell whether his money added to food provided or to the dividend 
checks distributed to the organization’s owners.  Nonprofit organizations are not legally able 
to enrich their owners and so provide a more trustworthy vehicle for purchasing this service.  
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This point, while clear in Hansmann’s informal treatment, is well-formalized in the work of 
Bilodeau and Slivinski (reproduced here as chapters 7 and 8 and discussed below). 
 
Hansmann was less confident that contract failure explains the role of most nonprofits in 
commercial markets, but argued (1990, reproduced here as chapter 12) that the model 
works well for at least one kind of commercial nonprofit – the mutual savings bank.  Although 
mutual savings banks distribute financial surpluses to their depositors, they are properly 
classified as nonprofits rather than consumer cooperatives because those receiving the 
distribution enjoy no control rights over the use of the bank’s assets.   They were established 
at a time when for-profit commercial banks did not take deposits from individuals.  
Hansmann explained the failure of for-profit banks to enter this market as a consequence of 
contract failure, when lightly-regulated banks had the incentive and opportunity to speculate 
wildly with other peoples’ money.  When commercial banks became better regulated, 
beginning in the mid nineteenth century, the nonprofit advantage shrank and was entirely 
neutralized by legislation passed in 1933.  Since then, no new mutual savings banks have 
been founded, but most of the existing ones persisted.       
 
Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) argued that contract failure also applies to nursing-home 
markets.  Contract failure applies here because some aspects of nursing care are hard to 
observe (such as whether the enfeebled elderly residents receive appropriate medication 
and are always treated with respect), because the person receiving residential care is often 
not the person deciding on the provider (the decider may be the children or the resident’s 
insurer), and because transferring the elderly to another facility is difficult if post-purchase 
experience proves that the promised quality of care is not being delivered (due to ‘transfer 
trauma’ or ‘transplantation shock’).  However, proving the extent of contract failure by for-
profit firms is no easy task.   
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If detecting less-than-promised quality were easy for the researcher, it is likely that the 
consumer would also be able to detect this departure and so contract failure would not 
occur.  In response to this dilemma, Weisbrod and Schlesinger found two subtle differences 
in quality that are consistent with Hansmann’s ideas.  First, although there was no difference 
between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes in the frequency of complaints to regulatory 
authorities about matters covered by the regulatory code, the frequency of complaints raised 
against for-profit homes on the typically hard-to-verify aspects of quality not covered by the 
code was substantially higher.  Second, although there was no difference between the 
sectors in the share of residents possessing a doctor’s prescription for sedatives, the staff of 
for-profit nursing homes administered these sedatives four times as frequently as did the 
staff at religiously-affiliated nonprofit homes.  Weisbrod (1998, reproduced here as chapter 
21) and Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) provided additional evidence on nursing homes and two 
other long-term care industries where contract failure is expected to be especially severe 
because of the consumer lock-in effect – psychiatric facilities and facilities for the mentally 
impaired.   
 
Chillemi and Gui (1991, reproduced here as chapter 13) formalized one way in which 
contract failure can persist in the face of experiential learning.  In their model, consumers 
can eventually find out whether the promised quality or quantity was delivered, but there is a 
substantial lag between service purchase and quality verification.  For-profit firms choose 
whether to maintain a reputation for trustworthiness or behave opportunistically for a short-
term gain.  A good reputation is more valuable when the price markup over costs is large.  In 
competitive markets, it is not possible to raise prices sufficiently and for-profit firms behave 
opportunistically.  In less competitive markets, for-profit firms will charge a high price and 
maintain the promised level of quality.  Thus, either for-profits or nonprofits can be trusted in 
noncompetitive markets, but the latter are trustworthy at a lower price.  
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Nondistribution of profits removes one motive for nonprofits to shortchange their donors and 
customers, but there are others.  Nominally nonprofit organizations may want to violate the 
spirit of the nondistribution constraint, taking advantage of their privileged information to 
increase their nonpecuniary perks.  Alternatively, nonprofits may cheat donors or customers 
in order to better subsidize a mission-related output that is not highly valued by the 
donor/customer pool (e.g., Steinberg and Gray, 1993).  Three papers amplify why nonprofits 
may nonetheless act in a trustworthy fashion much of the time.  First, Handy (1995) argued 
that board members will monitor the performance of their organization because, in effect, 
they post their reputation as collateral.  
 
Second, Ben-Ner (1986) analyzed the incentives of donors and customers to monitor and 
control performance, arguing that the identity of nonprofit board members is at least as 
important as the nondistribution constraint in solving problems of contract failure.  For-profit 
firms are controlled by ‘supply-side stakeholders’, investors who care far more about the 
financial returns resulting from their investment than about the creation of a product that they 
intend to consume.  In contrast, nonprofit organizations and consumer cooperatives are 
controlled by ‘demand-side stakeholders’ or ‘patrons’, who supply funds but are primarily 
concerned with consuming some output resulting from those funds.  Supply-side 
stakeholders want high prices and less-than-promised quality (in order to cut costs and so 
increase profits), and can be expected to behave opportunistically to further those objectives 
in cases of asymmetric information.  There is no such problem with demand-side 
stakeholders in control, for these owners want what all consumers want – low prices and 
promised levels of quality.  Because nonprofit outputs are collectively consumed, a demand-
side stakeholder serving as the manager will, in pursuing his own interest, generally 
advance the interests of other patrons. Thus, parents may be somewhat assured if their 
child is cared for by an organization that does not distribute profits, but they are far more 
assured if the owner’s children are also cared for by the same organization.  In placing the 
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emphasis on patron control, rather than nondistribution, Ben-Ner serves to explain a wider 
class of organizations that includes both nonprofits and consumer cooperatives. 
 
Third, following a suggestion made by the original Hansmann (1980) paper, Handy and Katz 
(1998, reproduced here as chapter 15) argued that the self-selection of managers into the 
nonprofit sector can help to solve contract failures.  They developed a formal model in which 
managers (and other key decisionmakers) differ in both their ability and their devotion to a 
nonprofit cause.  Although ability is somewhat observable (through costless tests that are 
admittedly imperfect), the nonprofit board can only learn a manager’s devotion by hiring him 
or her for a period of time.   They analyzed two strategies that nonprofit boards might take – 
one designed to promote self-selection by managerial devotion and the other designed to 
promote self-selection by ability.  The first strategy allows the firm to hire its manager for less 
and, of course, will attract only devoted applicants.  The second strategy has a lower chance 
of erroneously hiring a low-skilled manager but is more likely to hire an indifferent one.  They 
showed that the first strategy is better if a) testing errors are small, b) the applicant pool has 
a large share of devoted and productive candidates, c) the productivity of the low-skilled is 
low, and d) the productivity of highly-skilled but less-devoted is high.   
 
This paper illustrates how positive selection can help nonprofits to ‘get more by paying less’, 
but doesn’t quite get them to the desired conclusion that managerial self-selection helps to 
solve contract failure.  Their discussion of fringe benefits hints at how they can go that last 
step – if nonprofit managers value the quantity and quality of the output they produce, these 
count as part of managerial compensation and can result in the self-selection of managers 
that donors and clients can trust.  By harmonizing the interests of patrons and managers, 
this kind of selection can achieve the benefits suggested by Ben-Ner’s (1986) model of 
patron control.  When combined with insights from Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) about 
entrepreneurial self-selection on the basis of a preference for public goods and from Slivinski 
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(2002) on the effects of compensation on moral hazard, we have the promise of a more 
complete analysis in the near future.  
 
Two papers consider contract failure in a coexistence setting, where for-profits and 
nonprofits both persist in long-run equilibrium.  Hirth (1999, reproduced here as Chapter 14) 
presented a remarkably rich set of results that emphasize the interaction between the two 
sectors.  He considered a world in which quality comes in two levels – high (the promised 
level) and low (less than the promised level).  Consumers come in two types – informed 
(able to observe prices and whether quality is high or low at any particular supplier) or 
uninformed (able to observe prices and whether an organization is labeled as nonprofit or 
for-profit).  Uninformed consumers estimate the average quality at each type of supplier, but 
do not know the specific quality of any firms in the market.  There are two types of nonprofit 
organizations – honest nonprofits and ‘for-profits-in-disguise’ (a term coined by Weisbrod, 
1988).  As the name reveals, for-profits-in-disguise pretend to be nonprofits, obtaining the 
nonprofit label from legal authorities but distributing profits to their owners.  For-profits-in-
disguise attempt to benefit from the good reputation of nonprofits by selling low-quality 
services at a high-quality price. 
 
In Hirth’s model, the nondistribution constraint is imperfectly enforced, and this is what 
allows for-profits-in-disguise to exist.  More stringent enforcement of the nondistribution 
constraint increases the cost of production at for-profits-in-disguise, but not at honest 
nonprofits.  Depending upon how stringently the nondistribution constraint is enforced, three 
equilibrium configurations are possible.  When there is strict enforcement, all informed 
consumers buy from for-profits, which charge a lower price than nonprofits in equilibrium.  
Uninformed consumers turn to nonprofits, which are all honest as for-profits-in-disguise do 
not find it profitable to enter these markets.  The most interesting result is the competitive 
spillover benefit, where the presence of honest nonprofits improves the performance of for-
profits.   Specifically, the customers of for-profits are more likely to be informed when a 
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nonprofit alternative accommodates some of the uninformed, and this makes the for-profits 
more likely to supply high quality.  The nonprofit sector can ensure that only high-quality is 
provided in both sectors even if it is not large enough to serve all the uninformed.  Thus, the 
presence of a few nonprofits in a mixed-sector market can entirely solve the problem of 
asymmetric information. 
 
If the nondistribution constraint is moderately enforced, honest nonprofits will ‘limit price’ in 
order to make it unprofitable for for-profits-in-disguise to enter the market.  At this lower 
price, honest nonprofits lack the capacity to serve all the uninformed customers, and so 
honest nonprofits will employ waiting lists and other nonprice rationing devices.  There is still 
a positive spillover benefit from having nonprofits in the market. 
 
Finally, if enforcement of the nondistribution constraint is weak, honest nonprofits cannot 
survive competition from for-profits-in-disguise without special help.  Tax breaks and the like 
do not suffice for this purpose, because they are granted equally to honest nonprofits and 
for-profits-in-disguise.  Volunteer labor could supply the needed cushion, as on-site 
volunteers would have an easier time distinguishing honest nonprofits and would be unlikely 
to continue offering their services to a for-profit-in-disguise.  In this case, there could be 
either domination by honest nonprofits or coexistence of honest nonprofits and for-profits-in-
disguise.  Regardless, some informed consumers would patronize honest nonprofits, and 
the competitive spillover benefit is eliminated.   
 
In Hirth’s model, all consumers are alike and all would prefer to purchase high quality if the 
prices of high and low were set at their respective marginal costs.  Thus, there is an identity 
between  ‘high’ and ‘the promised level’ of quality.  In reality, tastes differ and some might 
prefer to buy low quality even if fully informed.  Hirth sketches an alternative model where 
tastes differ and everyone is fully informed.  Then, nonprofits would choose their niche 
depending upon their objective function and for-profits would accommodate all residual 
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demand.  The two sectors would behave differently, but this is a matter of specialization 
rather than market failure – if nonprofits didn’t exist, for-profits would supply the same 
mixture of high and low quality as supplied by the two sectors when they coexist.   
 
Hirth was silent, however, on what would happen if tastes differed in an asymmetric 
information framework.  Handy (1997, reproduced here as chapter 17) hints at some of the 
answers here.  She builds on Weisbrod’s (1988) suggestion that the outputs include both 
easy- (type I) and hard-to-observe (type II) characteristics.  Consumers’ marginal rate of 
substitution between type I and type II characteristics will vary because their tastes differ and 
because they assign different probabilities to their ability to recognize and purchase their 
intended level of type II.  With diverse tastes, it is not surprising that some consumers will 
choose nonprofits and some for-profits and this is what she finds. However, she hints at a 
variety of complications and institutional features that would have to be incorporated before 
confronting this prediction with data.  What is really needed is a model that combines 
Handy’s ideas on consumer diversity with the rich structure of market interaction in Hirth’s 
(1999) model.  
 
Other Roles Played by Nonprofits 
 
Clotfelter (1992, reproduced here as Chapter 5) began the scant literature on the role of 
nonprofits in the distribution of income.  He carefully delineated the pathways by which 
nonprofits serve to redistribute income, paying special attention to the counterfactual (what 
would the distribution be in a world that lacked nonprofits).  What is surprising, however, is 
how little is known about the extent to which charitable organizations (let alone other kinds 
of nonprofits) help the poor.  Steinberg and Weisbrod (reproduced here as Chapter 24) 
elaborated on the mechanisms individual nonprofit organizations can use to redistribute 
income, including sliding scale fees and other forms of price discrimination; rationing by 
waiting, eligibility rules, or product quality dilution; and client recruiting strategies.  They 
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showed how nonprofits with distributional objectives would use these mechanisms differently 
from for-profits, and hint at some of the side-effects relevant to the choice of technique.   
 
Testing for these differences is complicated with existing data, if for no other reason than 
that the various sources of nonprofit revenue (from fees, dues, and donations) are expected 
to interact.  For example, Kingma (1995) found that Red Cross health and safety training 
classes had large negative impacts on donations, whereas an exogenous increase in 
donations reduced commercial profits.  Studies of nonprofits more generally suffer from data 
limitations, but two fine studies included here strongly suggest the importance of revenue 
interactions:  Schiff and Weisbrod (1991, reproduced here as Chapter 26) and Segal and 
Weisbrod (1998, reproduced here as Chapter 20).    
 
James (1986; 1989) proposed that nonprofits play a role in shaping preferences (particularly 
religious preferences).  She noted that many nonprofits have been founded by religious 
bodies, arguing that perhaps this represents a conscious strategy to obtain converts.  Young 
people in school, sick people in hospitals, or needy people in shelters are especially 
vulnerable to proselytization.  This is why, she suggested, schools and universities, 
hospitals, long-term care facilities, and homeless shelters were often started by religious 
bodies.  The competition for converts is fiercer where there is religious diversity.  Thus, the 
finding in her 1993 paper (reproduced here as Chapter 11) that private nonprofit educational 
institutions have a larger market share in religiously-heterogeneous societies is consistent 
with the religious proselytization theory as well as Weisbrod’s model of public-goods 
provision by nonprofits.   
 
Although James’ work on nonprofits’ role in inducing preferences has stimulated much 
admiration, few have, as yet, taken up the call to advance the analysis.  There is also little 
formal economic analysis of advocacy organizations (such as the Sierra Club, National 
Organization for Women, National Rifle Association, or the Heritage Foundation) which, 
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whether they inform or alter preferences, illustrate an important societal role played by 
nonprofits.  There is also little on social marketing – nonprofit efforts to get people to practice 
safe sex, moderate their drinking, appreciate environmental amenities, and stop child abuse. 
 
The Third Wave: Integrated Models 
 
Second wave papers emphasized the demand side – why people would like to give or to buy 
from nonprofit organizations.  Third wave models also incorporate a supply side, seeking to 
understand why anyone would start a nonprofit organization that played the roles 
demanded.  Ideally, both the entry decision and the choice of objective functions would be 
integrated into one model of how nonprofits behave among other organizations. 
 
James (1986) theory of religious proselytization discussed above has elements of both the 
supply and demand side, as does Ben-Ner (1986).  However, the first paper that developed 
both the supply and demand for nonprofit organizations is Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 
(1991, reproduced here as Chapter 3).  This paper repeated the variety of existing theories 
of the demand for nonprofit services, then argued that nonprofits arise to meet that demand 
when the benefits of formation exceed operating plus transactions costs.  Transactions costs 
include the need to a) identify and assemble a collection of willing stakeholders, b) 
determine whether collective demand is sufficient to cover costs, c) organize production 
decisions, d) induce stakeholders to reveal their preferences truthfully, and e) establish a 
governance mechanism to insure stakeholder control against free-riding, agency problems, 
and the like.  Potential entrepreneurs compare the net benefits to establishing a ‘self-
provision coalition’ (either a new nonprofit or consumer cooperative) with the net benefits of 
lobbying government to fund the service in question or regulate alternative providers.  
Although this paper is informal, it is richly sprinkled with considerations that formal modelers 
should incorporate.   
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In my 1993 paper (reproduced here as Chapter 4), I argued that there was a need for formal 
integrated models for the purposes of public-policy analysis.  Ideally, I said, a model would 
do four things: a) properly incorporate the legal constraints that define an organization as 
nonprofit, b) demonstrate how the postulated objective function emerges endogenously 
within the regulatory and competitive environment specified, c) specify how the relevant 
competing organizations (for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental) would emerge 
endogenously and d) specify the information structure under which agents operate.  I think 
the second criterion is particularly important for policy analysts.  It is not enough to uncover 
the organization's current objective function and verify that this objective remains viable 
following regulatory change.  Some policy changes will allow the nonprofit to accomplish a 
different set of outcomes.  In the long run, this implies that the founders of organizations will 
consider the nonprofit option in a different light, and may incorporate different objectives into 
the organization’s charter and bylaws (Young, 1983).  In addition, managers and workers will 
sort themselves into the sector on a different basis (Hansmann, 1980).  Thus, the short-run 
effect of policy changes (while the organizational objective function remains constant) differs 
from the long-run effect (after the objective evolves).  This point has been illustrated in more 
detail in an unpublished paper (Eckel and Steinberg, 1994), although published work 
deriving general results would be quite welcome.  
 
A remarkable series of papers by Bilodeau and Slivinski provide an integrated model of how 
entrepreneurs that value the provision of public goods would found and support nonprofit 
organizations.  Their 1996 paper concentrates on the self-selection among nonprofit 
entrepreneurs. Their 1998 paper (reproduced here as Chapter 7) showed why such an 
entrepreneur would rationally choose to constrain his future possibilities to receive profits.  
Their 1997 paper (reproduced here as Chapter 8) analyzed the endogenous emergence of 
one type of market competition among nonprofits.  An unpublished paper by Bilodeau (2000) 
analyzed the participation of donative nonprofit organizations in commercial markets that 
also contain for-profit firms.  The common framework employed in all these papers shows 
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considerable promise as a platform to build a general and integrated theory of donative 
nonprofit organizations. 
 
Their basic approach considered a three-stage game of complete information, where the 
players care about the quantity of some pure public good.  One of these individuals self-
selects to play the entrepreneurial role and considers whether to start a nonprofit or a for-
profit organization with an initial investment of effort and a ‘seed donation’.  Following this 
initial investment, other players simultaneously choose how much to donate, and then the 
entrepreneur decides whether to make an additional donation, positive or negative.  The 
game ends when total donations are used to produce the public good.  If the nonprofit form 
is selected, the entrepreneur cannot make a negative donation (that is, withdraw some or all 
of his initial investment) at the third stage.  This assures the second-stage donors that their 
contributions will not be expropriated by the entrepreneur.  In the first stage, the 
entrepreneur makes a large donation so that second-stage donors do not expect to get 
anything more from the entrepreneur in the third stage.  In this way, the entrepreneur does 
not allow second-stage donors to free-ride off his expected largesse.  Entrepreneurs choose 
to constrain their future options to receive profits because it is in their self-interest to do so.  
The nondistribution constraint serves as a credible commitment device that results in an 
equilibrium where they can enjoy a larger quantity of the public good with a smaller personal 
contribution. 
 
The second Bilodeau and Slivinski paper (1997, reproduced here as Chapter 8) considered 
multiple public goods, and whether a single ‘united fundraising organization (UFO)’ or rival 
charities would be created.  They assumed away many factors that explain combined 
campaigns (which are covered elsewhere, notably, in Rose-Ackerman 1980) in order to 
focus on the issue of preference mismatch.  If, for example, a donor cares only about one of 
the two public goods supported by a UFO, the diversion of 50% of his contribution to the 
other public good is equivalent to a doubling of the effective price of giving.  However, that 
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same donor is glad that 50% of the contributions of others will go to the public good he 
supports, even though other donors may not like that public good.  On balance, total 
contributions go down if fixed-percentage allocation rules are used by a UFO that provides 
two mutually-substitutable public goods.  Simple donor designation plans (where the donor 
declares that his contribution is to be used to support only some public goods) do not 
overcome this problem, as the UFO can undo any designation by reallocating its 
undesignated funds.  However, if the UFO credibly commits to allocate a fixed share of 
unrestricted funds to each member agency, donor designations become effective and total 
donations go up.    
 
Bilodeau (2000) extended the approach to commercial activity undertaken to provide more 
resources in support of a public good (what is generally referred to in the policy debates as 
‘unrelated business income’ to stress the lack or relation to the organization’s mission).  
However, the Bilodeau and Slivinski approach has not been extended to purely commercial 
nonprofits.  The closest we come to an integrated theory of commercial nonprofits is the 
paper by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001, reproduced here as Chapter 16).  They formalized 
Hansmann’s ideas on contract failure in a model that incorporates the decision of the initial 
entrepreneur about whether to form a nonprofit or a for-profit organization.  For them, a 
nonprofit organization is one that distributes benefits to the owners of the organization as 
perquisites, rather than cash.  This ‘softens’ incentives to deliver less than the promised 
quality to the customer, so that nonprofit quality is higher. 
 
Specifically, an organization sells a unit of a private good that has noncontractible attributes.  
Noncontractible attributes are qualities that may be known to both the buyer and the seller, 
but cannot be objectively measured so that third parties (such as the courts) cannot 
determine whether the terms of the contract have been broken.  The product in question is 
privately consumed, but entrepreneurs nonetheless care about quality for either ethical or 
reputational reasons.  A term consistent with either of these concerns is inserted into the 
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cost function, and entrepreneurs maximize profits after accounting for both pecuniary and  
nonpecuniary costs.   
 
Any expenditure as cash has higher value to entrepreneurs than that same expenditure as 
perks, so that all else equal, entrepreneurs prefer to found for-profit organizations.  However, 
consumers will pay a higher price to an organization that is trusted.  If the price they are 
willing to pay is sufficiently higher, the trusted organization can finance higher quality and a 
more than compensating increase in the volume of perks.  They closed the model by 
showing that by committing to the nonprofit form, the entrepreneur sends a credible signal 
that she can be trusted.  The soft incentives provided in the nonprofit form reduce the gains 
to shortchanging consumers on quality without reducing the costs, so the equilibrium quality 
level will be higher. 
 
I am not certain that soft incentives capture the essence of what is distinctive about nonprofit 
organizations.  For example, for-profit firms subject to a profits tax also face a softening of 
incentives, as do firms governed by rate-of-return regulations.  Nonetheless, as the first 
integrated model of a commercial nonprofit organization, Glaeser and Shleifer’s analysis 
may form the foundation for a more satisfactory model, particularly if Hirth’s (1999) insights 
can be incorporated in this framework.  Ultimately, we would want to extend the analysis 
further, to endogenize the choice between founding a commercial or donative nonprofit, a 
process begun by Bilodeau (2000).  
 
Intersectoral Comparisons of Performance 
 
Hundreds of studies have attempted to compare the performance of nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations when they each provide similar services.  Most of these studies have focused 
on hospitals.  However, many studies of nursing homes, mental health care, and day care 
centers and a smaller number of studies of employment counseling and placement, drug 
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and alcohol treatment programs, arts organizations, recycling centers, and mortuaries also 
exist.  Most consider the competition between generic nonprofits and for-profits, but some 
distinguish types within each sector (secular vs. religiously-affiliated, chain vs. independent).  
Some studies also compare government direct provision with the various forms of private 
provision.  The various studies have focused on diverse measures of performance – 
efficiency, pricing, input use, quality, and quantity, provision of charity care, sharing of 
information, and provision of other community benefits.  In this book, we include an 
important essay on quality differences in long-term care facilities (Weisbrod, 1998, 
reproduced as Chapter 21), an example of the best that the hospital studies have offered to 
date (McClellan and Staiger, 2000, reproduced as Chapter 23) and a variety of 
methodological warnings to emphasize the extreme limitations of our progress to date 
(including Pauly, 1987 and parts of Weisbrod 1998 and Hirth 1999, reproduced here as 
Chapters 22, 21, and 14 respectively). 
 
Rather than summarize each individually, I wish to emphasize these methodological 
problems.  First, any differences in performance may result from the strategic choices of 
organizations, and need not inhere in the organizations themselves.  For example, Pauly 
(1987) noted that the finding by some studies that for-profit hospitals have lower costs of 
production may simply represent the fact that for-profits choose to locate where operating 
costs are expected to be lower (and hence profits higher).  Second, organizations produce a 
multiplicity of outputs, and if some (for example community wellness education, medical 
training, and research) are not incorporated in the empirics, costs will be wrongly attributed 
to the others.  A large number of unused hospital beds seems like a source of inefficiency if 
we look only at medical care currently provided, but the picture changes if we consider the 
option value of extra beds in times of disaster or epidemics (Holtman, 1983).  Third, 
differences in output quality may be subtle.  As noted before, for-profits do not exhibit 
contract failure for attributes that are easy to measure – only for those that are hard for the 
buyer, the courts, and regulators to observe.  Finally, observed differences are neither 
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necessary nor sufficient indicators of market failures.  Hirth (1999, reproduced here as 
Chapter 14) emphasized the intersectoral spillover benefits, where the presence of a few 
nonprofit organizations in a mixed market raises the quality provided by for-profits.  No 
difference in quality would be observable, yet social welfare is improved.  Conversely, in his 
full information model, quality differences between the sectors reflect nonprofit choice of a 
niche and have no consequences for social welfare. 
 
A very nice empirical study by Leete (2001, reproduced here as Chapter 25) looked at the 
differences in wages paid by nonprofit and for-profit organizations.  If nonprofit workers 
derive utility from the output they produce, this counts as part of their total compensation and 
their monetary wages will be correspondingly lower.  If, on the other hand, nonprofits 
distribute their financial returns to line employees (as permitted under nondistribution 
because line employees are not in control of the organization), then nonprofit wages will be 
higher.  A variety of other factors are also relevant, and Leete analyzed many of these.  The 
patterns of wage difference by nonprofit industry and occupation allow one to explore a 




This volume barely touches on public policy toward the nonprofit sector for several reasons.  
First, this book is designed for an international audience, whereas much of the literature 
covers the specific policies of specific countries.  Second, this book is designed for the 
coverage of enduring issues in the nonprofit sector, and much of the literature concerns 
proposals of the moment.  Third, there was simply not space to cover everything.  I cover 
two issues that are likely to cross national boundaries and endure – policy regarding the 
coexistence in commercial markets of nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and policy 
regarding government contracting with private agencies (for-profit and nonprofit) for service 
delivery.  I neglect other issues of enduring cross-national significance – the proper 
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treatment of donations in personal income tax systems, the proper treatment of nonprofit 
entities in entity tax systems, the adaptation of antitrust policy to nonprofit combinations in 
restraint of trade, the regulation (or not) of fundraising, the restriction (or facilitation) of 
nonprofit accumulations of capital, and the design of operational definitions for the 
enforcement of the nondistribution constraint (particularly when nonprofits convert to for-
profits). Steinberg (2003) provides a brief survey and evaluation of these literatures.  Many 
papers included here have something to say about these issues, but none treat them 
comprehensively. 
 
Schiff and Weisbrod (1991, reproduced here as Chapter 26) examined nonprofit efforts to 
generate profits from ‘unrelated business income’ to cross-subsidize their charitable mission.  
For example, a nonprofit museum might sell artwork reproductions through mail catalogs, or 
a university might sell computers to the general public through its bookstores.  Concern has 
been raised, in a variety of countries, about whether this kind of commercial activity by 
nonprofit organizations is fair, proper, and socially-efficient.  These concerns are particularly 
acute when nonprofit organizations receive a variety of tax breaks or subsidies not granted 
to their for-profit competitors.  The ‘destination of income’ test that regards any such activity 
as proper provided all the net proceeds are spent on the charitable mission of the 
organization, has gradually been replaced in most countries (other than Australia) by a 
‘source of income’ test.  Thus, current U.S. policy applies the ‘unrelated business income 
tax’ to the unrelated business income of nonprofit organizations, presumably to place 
nonprofits and their competitors on a ‘level playing field’.  Schiff and Weisbrod provided an 
important first analysis of the underlying policy considerations.  They adapted James’ (1983) 
model, regarding unrelated business as a neutral or disfavored activity used to subsidize a 
favored activity, estimated the relevant parameters of that model, and commented on the 
economic efficiency of various policy alternatives. 
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James (1998, reproduced here as Chapter 27) summarized a variety of papers that, 
following Schiff and Weisbrod, regard unrelated business as a disfavored activity pursued by 
nonprofits seeking to cross-subsidize public goods.  She contrasted this application of her 
theory with an alternative hypothesis – that nonprofits engage in commercial activities to 
increase their total revenues.  She offered two rationales for the alternative theory.  First, 
nonprofits may wish to distribute their surplus, either as allowable perks or secret cash 
distributions.  Second, nonprofit managers may enjoy the power and prestige that stem from 
governing a larger organization.  Under the alternative theory, commercial revenues need 
not cross-subsidize public goods.  She found that the first approach adequately 
characterizes the behavior of universities, museums, and zoos in some of their activities, the 
alternative approach characterizes behavior in hospital conversions or university 
biotechnology and computing partnerships, and both approaches seem to play a role in 
social service and public broadcasting organizations.   
 
Governments around the world contract with private agencies, for-profit and nonprofit, to 
deliver social services.  Problems of free-riding and nonmarketability of outputs are 
overcome through government finance, and problems of monopoly and bureaucratic 
dysfunction are overcome through private provision, at least in theory.  In practice, serious 
and interesting questions of policy design intervene.  How does competitive bidding work 
when contract failure is suspected?  Should bids be adjusted for differences in taxable 
status or other differences between nonprofit and for-profit bidders?  These questions were 
developed in more detail, and tentative answers were suggested, in my 1997 paper.  When 
are nonprofit organizations selected as service provider?  To what extent do economic 
efficiencies, rather than political factors, determine this choice.  These are the issues raised 
and first answered by Ferris and Graddy’s pioneering work (1997, reproduced here as 
Chapter 28). 
 





Although gaps remain in each of the three waves of nonprofit theorizing, it is fair to say that 
we now have a rudimentary understanding of the role and behavior of nonprofit 
organizations within a broader economy.  In my opinion, here are some top priorities for 
future research.  First, our current integrated models are static.  We need to better 
understand the life cycles of nonprofit organizations.  What are the impacts of governance 
structures and environmental factors on the evolution of the organizational mission?  We 
need multiperiod models of fundraising and the giving decision.  Second, we need to better 
understand the distributional aspects of nonprofit organizations.  The theory of price and 
non-price rationing by nonprofit organizations is underdeveloped, and empirical work on this 
subject is almost nonexistent.  Third, we need to develop more encompassing models for 
public policy analysis, and to obtain estimates of many key behavioral parameters needed 
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